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The New
Nationalists
Once upon a time, Karl Marx thought nationalism would 
wither away. Now it seems to be back with a vengeance.
Tom Morton spoke to Eric Hobsbawm about 
nationalism, its revival, and the prospects for the new, 
fragmented states of Europe.
□ ric Hobsbawm is emeritus professor of h isto ry  at B irk b eck  C ollege, University of London. He was born in Alexandria in 1917, and emigrated to Britain with his family in his youth. He is the author of such celebrated works of history as Labouring Men, The Age of Empire and Industry and 
Empire. He was also a key f igure in debates within 
the British Left in the 1980s. His latest book, 
Nations and N ationalism , is p u b lish ed  by 
Cambridge University Press.
One of the central points you make at the beginning of 
your recent book about nationalism is that nations are a 
modem phenomenon. They appeared essentially in the 
18th and early 19th centimes and the idea of the nation
simply wasn't in people's heads before then. Why is it 
that nationalism appears at that time and what is it about 
nationalism that's new?
The first thing to understand is that there's a tremendous 
difference between the sense of belonging to a particular 
group, such as being a Kurd, or a Jew, and the idea that 
being a Kurd or a Jew should mean having a state of the 
Kurds or the Jews. If you like, the idea of identity as part of 
an ethnic or linguistic group belongs to history, to society, 
to anthropology. Nationalism, on the other hand, belongs 
to a particular political program. It's that political program 
which is new and basically, give or take a few predecessors, 
it only comes in with the American and French revolutions.
What is it that's different about people thinking of them­
selves, say, as French, Spanish or American as compared 
to thinking of themselves as Romans or Greeks or Goths?
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And the other idea is that these new states should be a 
particular kind of state, a state run by a central government 
which has a direct pipeline, directly from the centre to each 
and every last citizen. That's quite new. In the Middle Ages, 
people weren't governed that way. They were governed 
through intermediate lords and corporations, through in­
termediate autonomous groups. And if you put those two 
ideas together, you get the makings of the modern nation 
state.
One of the confusing things about nationalism is that, on 
the one hand, it is very much a modem phenomenon—if 
we think of the modem era as beginning in the 18th 
century with the Enlightenment. But on the other hand 
when people start thinking of themselves as belonging 
to nations, they imagine those nations as stretching far 
back into time. How important is it to the emergence of 
nations to invent histories and traditions for themselves?
Of course, sometimes they do stretch back far into time. The 
problem is the assumption that those age-old traditions 
mean the same as modern nationalism. There's probably 
not been a time when the Jews didn't think of themselves 
as different from the people among whom they lived. But 
until the 1890s, practically nobody thought that this im­
plied that the Jews should have a state of their own in 
Palestine. In fact, most Jews didn't live in what is today 
Israel even in the days of the Romans. They probably lived 
in Babylonia, in Egypt and elsewhere. The sleight of hand 
arises in the combination of something which has existed 
for a very long time, such as the idea that Jews are different 
from non-Jews, and the much more modern idea—in fact 
the entirely non-traditional idea— that this should require 
a particular territorial state. I'm not talking just about the 
Jews in this regard; I'm talking about any ethnic or linguis­
tic group which makes this claim. That claim almost cer­
tainly implies inventing history.
Thinking of yourself as French or Spanish is a political act 
which means thinking of yourself as a member of a Spanish 
state or a French state. It's perfectly compatible with think­
ing yourself as Breton or a Provencal or a Fleming or a 
Catalan. Practically all the old nation states, including 
Great Britain, France and Spain were in fact by modem 
standards multilingual, multiethnic and multinational. To 
be English or to be British does not mean to be a member 
of a particular ethnic group. To be English can mean being 
a member of an ethnic group, just as being French can mean 
that, but it's not the same thing.
So the emergence of the idea of the nation is tied up also 
with the growth of new ideas about the state and politics 
which appear in the 18th century?
There are two new ideas here. One is democracy: the idea 
that the state is composed of citizens, not of subjects. And 
that's expressed itself as a belief in the self-determination 
of peoples—a concept which originally has absolutely 
nothing to do with language, or ethnicity. Take the United 
States which is the classic example of the early form of the 
nation state. To be an American is an open invitation to 
anybody who wishes to accept the rights and duties of the 
citizenship of the United States of America, never mind 
where he or she comes from. And that basically was the 
situation of the original France, or the French Revolution, 
or the original idea of the democratic nation state.
According to this conception, insofar as you take part in 
the politics of a democratic society or a citizen state, you 
think of yourself as a citizen of that state and that gives you, 
if you like, a member of that nation. This is of course very 
different from the current idea of what being a member of 
a nation is. It's not until quite late in the 19th century that 
this idea became mixed up with, and today has been almost 
completely identified with, the idea of a particular ethnic 
group and a particular linguistic group being the people.
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In many cases these peoples have to invent history because 
very often their history isn't that old. For instance, there is 
the case of the current dispute in the Caucasus between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh. The 
argument is over which of the two the enclave really 
belongs to. This is entirely conducted in terms of 
mediaeval history because originally it belonged to 
neither; it belonged to a people which has now disap­
peared called the Caucasian Albanians. And so Armenian 
historians claim that the Armenians that live there now are 
the lineal descendants of these Caucasian Albanians while 
the Azerbaijanis claim that, in fact, they are the original 
Caucasian Albanians who have just taken to talking Azer­
baijani. That's the kind of argument which is used to justify 
current disputes and conflicts. But of course if you could 
talk to people in the 15th century in these areas, this dispute 
would have seem completely meaningless.
How does that process work? Who are the agents of 
reinventing history, reinventing traditions?
Often j t  used to be "patriotic" historians. In places like 
Georgia and the Caucasus historical novels were impor­
tant, and schoolteachers passed on these ideas in class. 
Today, of course, it's the media in general. For that matter 
it could be operatic composers; it could be composers of 
folk songs; it could be almost anybody. There's a huge 
process of invention going on. I'm bound to say that we 
historians are in this respect a little bit like poppy growers 
in Pakistan; we provide the raw material for the drug 
addicts. Only, unfortunately for nationalism, professional 
historians don't provide the right kind of raw material.
In your book you argue that in the latter part of the 19th 
century the nature of nationalism changes and that, in 
fact, it's the emergence of modem forms of the state 
which transform iL How did this happen?
Part of the transformation occurred through the spread of 
the franchise. Once universal suffrage becomes the norm, 
candidates feel that there's an advantage in appealing to 
the voters on the strength of those things that voters think 
they have in common—and being Irish or Polish in multi­
lingual societies would be one of those things. And so that 
becomes quite an important issue. It still doesn't necessari­
ly explain the modern kind of separatist nationalism, how­
ever. Scottish and Welsh nationalism  in Britain is 
longstanding, but it hasn't always necessarily led to Scot­
tish or Welsh separatism. What it has more usually meant 
is that, for instance, Welsh voters tended to pick one of the 
all-British parties—in this instance, first the Liberal Party, 
then the Labour Party. It took a very long time before Welsh 
nationalism turned into a specific demand for for Welsh 
autonomy. It didn't become a major issue in Wales until the 
1960s.
Is there also a sense in which the modernising state 
appropriates some of the rhetoric of nationalism from the 
kind of democratic nationalist movements which came 
to prominence in the 1848 revolutions for conservative 
ends?
There's no doubt that among the older nations towards the 
end of the 19th century nationalism switched from being 
a cause of the Left to one of the Right. In this it was assisted 
partly by the appeal of imperialism, and partly by the 
enormous migratory movements which actually brought 
ordinary citizens face to face with a lot of foreigners, often 
for the first time. And partly, of course, by the threat of the 
then new political movements like the labour movement 
and the socialist movement
But you also quote the interesting example of Colonel 
Pilsudski, the liberator of Poland—who himself was a 
democrat and was identified with the Left You cite Pil­
sudski as saying it's the state which makes the nation and 
not the nation which makes the state. What do you think 
he meant by that precisely?
He meant what everybody actually knows; that that there 
is very little grass roots drive in nationalism until you 
manage to set up a state. If you've got a bottle you can put 
some wine into it. It's not the wine that makes the bottle, 
but the bottle which contains the liquid. Pilsudski knew 
perfectly well that there were a lot of people who called 
themselves Poles, but there were also other people in 
historic Poland who were not Poles. To become Poland and 
to get a Polish national sentiment was impossible until 
there was a Polish state.
In Yugoslavia right now the conflict there is seen partly 
as a conflict between Catholic Croatia and Orthodox 
Serbia—and we can see similar kinds of conflict else­
where in Eastern Europe. How important is religion in 
the making of modem national identities?
It can be an alternative, or a component: but it's not very 
often that it is a primary component. In the case of the 
Croat-Serb conflict, almost the only thing apart from his­
tory which distinguishes these two peoples who look the 
same and talk the same language, is that one is Roman 
Catholic and the other is Orthodox Christian. But that's not 
particularly typical. For example, Islamic fundamentalism 
is only by the sheerest accident a nationalist factor. To the 
best of my knowledge Islamic fundamentalism has not 
actually generated a nationalist movement anywhere.
You make the point in your book that there was an idea 
current at the end of the 19th century that nations had to 
be of a certain size to be real nations. For instance, the 
Sicilians, or the Basques, or the Bohemians or the Welsh 
wouldn't qualify to be a nation because there weren't 
enough of them or because they didn't occupy a big 
enough territory. How important was that for the 
development of nationalism in the 20th century?
It dominated the way the map of Europe was redrawn in 
the middle of the 19th century. But at the end of the 19th 
century they dropped the idea that a nation had to be a 
minimum viable size. And one of the reasons why the 
peace treaties at the end of World War I were such a mess 
was precisely because they drew up frontiers in terms 
which had no relationship at all to the historic or economic 
viability of nation states. They drew them up at least in
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theory on purely ethnic/linguistic criteria. And now the 
chickens of the Treaties of Versailles and Brest-Litovsk are, 
so to speak, coming home to roost.
The same idea seems to dominate the thinking of, say, the 
European Community—the idea that somehow the small 
nations like the Baltic States, and even the component 
republics of Yugoslavia, don't quite qualify to be nations 
and things would be much easier if they'd stay in these 
larger units.
Well, wouldn't it be easier?
Perhaps it would be. But isn't there a sense in which 
we've missed the political boat by saying in the West that 
you should stay together because you won't cause us so 
much trouble if you stay together as Yugoslavia or 
Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union? Haven't we perhaps 
promoted conflicts in these areas by saying you've got to 
stay together because you're not big enough?
I don't actually think that is so. The people who argue that 
it would be better if the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia stayed 
together are not the people who created the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We find ourselves 
faced with a situation in which a lot of new states—in some 
instances, in the case of the Soviet Union, almost phantom 
states—are appearing out of the ashes of former federal 
states. Obviously we have to make the best we can of this, 
and sooner or later, no doubt, we have to recognise them. 
But do you honestly believe that a Europe composed of a 
lot of places like Macedonia and Slovakia is going to be 
more stable than the Europe we've had for 40 to 50 years? 
Do you believe that the Soviet Union composed of all these 
quarrelling successor republics is going to be the basis of 
peace and quiet in the area between Vienna and the Pacific 
Ocean?
It does seem that we don't have the analytical tools to 
understand what's going on, because it seems as though 
that within every nation there is a sub-nation or a smaller 
nation trying to get ou t For instance, in Slovakia, you 
have Slovakia which considers itself perhaps separate 
from Czechoslovakia. Yet within Slovakia you have a 
Hungarian minority saying we don't belong here either? 
we want to be Hungarians separate from Slovakia. Why 
has that happened? Why is there this kind of atomisation 
and disintegration into the smallest possible unit?
It's happening because the idea that states should be com­
posed of one ethnic or linguistic group, every nation a state, 
is totally unrealistic. There are maybe 170 states in the 
world today, and of these I suppose at best a dozen come 
anyw here near being eth nically  or lin gu istica lly  
homogeneous. So it's patently clear that this is not really a 
world program. The distribution of peoples over the face 
of the world including the face of Europe is a lot older that 
the idea of independent nation states— particularly ethnic 
nation states—and consequently most of these are in fact 
just as mixed as larger states from which they break away. 
What's more, in the 20th century, the modem economy
means that people are constantly moving. So even if you've 
got one homogeneous state as a result of expelling or killing 
off all the foreigners, somebody else is going to come in. 
This is how the modem world economy works; it's an 
economy of migration. Consequently the idea of a ter­
ritorial state based on a particular ethnic/linguistic group 
is not one that can work for any length of time.
It does seem to have come back with a particular 
virulence now, though, doesn't it?
That's right.
Why?
Because these countries are falling apart as political en­
tities. I don't believe there is intrinsically more ethnic 
hatred in Yugoslavia than in Spain, or, for that matter, in 
Great Britain. The difference is that Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union fell apart politically from inside. And natural­
ly they are breaking up along the political fracture lines. 
They're breaking up into the republics—Croatia, Serbia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia and so on—which were supposed to 
be nationally and ethnically defined. We don't even know 
how many of the inhabitants of the Ukraine, Moldavia or 
Byelorussia initially really felt about secession. It's pretty 
certain that in the Soviet Union three years ago, with the 
exception of the Baltic states, there was no serious mass 
demand for secession anywhere. They have to secede be­
cause the whole box of tricks is falling to pieces; they have 
to secede in self-defence. Once they secede they have 
another set of problems.
At the same time as the idea of the modem nation state 
emerged in the 18th century in Europe and the Americas, 
there was the emergence in Europe of another kind of 
idea which has become important in our own time: the 
notion of a United Europe. You find it in the writings of 
the German philosopher Kant and some of his contem­
poraries. I wonder if you think that in our own time the 
idea of Europe can be a kind of counterbalance for these 
forces of fragmentation.
Personally, I doubt it. I think the most likely thing is for 
people to have multiple identification. They might say: I'm 
a European, when confronted by the Americans or 
Japanese. But I don't see that this is going to replace the 
sentiment of being English or Portuguese or Czech. But 
then I don't think we want to abolish the sentiment of being 
Czech or Croat. What we want to do is to stop people killing 
each other over it. It has now got to the stage where only a 
very few among the Irish kill each other over the question 
of being Irish. That's a step forward. No doubt in God's 
good time this may happen in Eastern Europe, but it will 
take quite a long time. I think we look forward to a pretty 
gloomy and conflict-laden time for the next few years.
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